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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did Bridlewood Corporation discharge its duty of

disclosure when its agent, Robert Penton, disclosed to the
plaintiffs1 agent, Steve Brown, the fact that soil slippage
existed on the property and the fact that George Adamson, an
engineer, had examined the slippage and rendered an opinion
about it?
2.

Did Bridlewood Corporation, as seller of the

restaurant property, have any obligation to conduct an
investigation of the soil slippage on the restaurant property
and, if so, did Bridlewood discharge its obligation?
NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action for damages that the plaintiffs
claimed to have suffered as a result of soil slippage on
restaurant property they purchased from defendant Bridlewood
Corporation.

The plaintiffs alleged that Bridlewood either

intentionally or negligently misrepresented the character of
the property or that Bridlewood intentionally concealed from
them the fact of the soil slippage on the property.

The

plaintiffs have also argued, though it was not alleged in the
complaint, that the defendant breached a duty to investigate
the facts surrounding the soil slippage.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a trial to the court, Judge David E. Roth of the
Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, held that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Bridlewoodfs real estate agent, Bob Penton, had adequately
disclosed the facts surrounding the soil slippage on the
property.

As a result, Judge Roth entered judgment in favor of

the defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Bridlewood seeks an order of this Court affirming the
judgment of the trial court.

*.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs' statement of facts sets forth in
detail most of the facts relevant to this appeal.

In reality,

there were few disputed issues of fact at trial, and the
plaintiffs have accepted the trial court's findings of fact.
Bridlewood believes, however, that the following additional
facts are relevant to the points of law that the plaintiffs
argue in their brief.
Since the plaintiffs1 claim is for fraudulent
concealment, the critical facts relate to what Bridlewood,
.-

•

^ -....

through its agents, disclosed to the plaintiffs, through their
agent.

The testimony at trial revealed that all of the

essential information that Bridlewood knew about the condition
of the restaurant property was disclosed to the plaintiffs'
agent.

The only breakdown in communication occurred between

the plaintiffs' agent and the plaintiffs themselves.
The story of the discussions among the parties and
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their agents can get confusing.

The following "cast of

characters" is therefore supplied for the Court's reference:
Character

Role

Bridlewood Corporation

Defendant

Clinton Frank

Bridlewood's president

Rick Wadman

Bridlewood1s first listing agent

Bob Penton

Bridlewood's second listing agent

George Adamson

Engineer who examined the property

Robert Russo and
John Russo

Plaintiffs

Steve Brown

Plaintiffs' real estate agent

All of the discussions between the parties occurred
between their real estate agents; there was no direct contact
between Bridlewood and the plaintiffs.

(R. 191.) The

plaintiffs' agent, Steve Brown, was a longtime acquaintance of
the plaintiffs who did much more than merely act as a conduit
for offers and counteroffers.

(R.. 313.) Mr. Brown gave the

plaintiffs advice about available properties, the price to
offer for the property, and the terms of the offer.

He also

advised the plaintiffs about the restaurant business in
general, since Mr. Brown himself had operated a restaurant in
Ogden.

(R. 300.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Bridlewoodfs first agent, Rick Wadman, entered into a
listing agreement with Bridlewood on August 14, 1980. Mr.
Wadman's listing was renewed three times, and the last listing
ended on December 31, 1983. (R. 193.) Early in his listing
tenure, Mr. Wadman became aware that there was a crack in the
asphalt on the east side of the restaurant parking lot. That
crack appeared to Mr. Wadman to be stable until the Summer of
1983, when Wadman noted additional slippage.

(R. 199-200.)

In order to determine what was causing the apparent
slippage on the property, Mr. Wadman consulted George Adamson,
an engineer who had been recommended to Mr. Wadman because of
his knowledge of soils conditions in the Birch Creek area near
the restaurant.

(R. 208, 212.) Mr. Adamson looked at the

property with Mr. Wadman and told him that the additional
slippage had occurred because of saturation from recent heavy
rainfall.

Mr. Adamson told Mr. Wadman that he couldn't predict

exactly what would happen in the future, but that the soil
could remain stable for 50 to 100 years if there was no further
unusual saturation.

(R. 213.)

Mr. Wadman called Mr. Frank in Illinois to tell him
about his discussion with Mr. Adamson.
himself did not talk to Mr. Adamson.

(R. 214.) Mr. Frank
(R. 173.) Thus Mr.

Frank, and therefore Bridlewood, had no greater knowledge about
the condition of the property than did Mr. Wadman, since Mr.
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Wadman was the source of Bridlewoodfs knowledge of the
condition.
Bridlewood listed the property with its second agent,
Bob Penton, beginning January 1, 1984.

(R. 238.) Mr. Penton

obtained his knowledge about the condition of the property from
Mr. Wadman.

Mr. Wadman told Mr. Penton all of the essential

information about the condition of the property.

Mr. Wadman

told Mr. Penton that there was a crack in the asphalt, and
slippage on the east side of the property; that the cement slab
on which the freezer sat had cracked and fallen because of the
slippage; and that George Adamson, an engineer, had examined
the property and opined that it could slip again but that it
might be stable for 50 to 100 years.

(R. 224-5.) Mr. Wadman

also told Mr. Penton that Clinton Frank of Bridlewood was aware
of the soil slippage.

(R. 255.) At this point Mr. Penton knew

as much if not more than Mr. Frank knew about the soil
slippage, and thus had no reason to call Mr. Frank for more
information.
Mr. Penton immediately visited the property.

(R.

255.) Although there was snow on the ground that covered the
crack in the asphalt, Mr. Penton was able to see the area
underneath the freezer overhang where the cement slab had
fallen six to eight inches.

(R. 257-8.) Mr. Penton could see

that slippage without bending, stooping, or removing any snow.
(R. 273-4.)
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Mr. Penton immediately returned to his office to call
Steve Brown, the plaintiffs1 agent, to tell him what he had
seen.

(R. 262.) Mr. Penton spoke with Mr. Brown on the

telephone for 10 to 15 minutes.

(R. 263.) Mr. Penton passed

on to Mr. Brown precisely the same information that Penton had
received from Mr. Wadman.

Mr. Penton told Mr. Brown that he

had learned of the slippage from Wadman; that he (Penton) had
visited the property and had seen the soil slippage by the
freezer; and that George Adamson, the engineer, had examined
the property and opined that it might remain stable in the
future.

(R. 262-4; 291-2; 304-5.) Mr. Penton told Brown he

thought the plaintiffs should be informed of these facts.

(R.

263f 276.) Mr. Penton testified that Mr. Brown was concerned
and that Brown said he would talk to the plaintiffs about the
slippage and call Penton back.

Mr. Penton testified that Mr.

Brown told him the next day that the plaintiffs did not
consider the slippage a problem and would go ahead with the
closing.

(R. 265, 277.)
Mr. Brown in fact never visited the property, never

called Wadman or the engineer, and never told the plaintiffs
about his discussion with Penton.

(R. 305-6.) John Russo

testified that he would have been concerned if he had been told
an engineer had been hired to look at the property, and would
have gone back to look at the property if he had been told
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there was soil slippage on the property.

(R. 351-2.) Mr.

Brown conceded at the trial that Penton told him about both the
soil slippage and the engineer's visit to the property.

(R.

292, 305.)
The plaintiffs contend that Brown justifiably confused
the slippage that Mr. Penton described with some drainage
erosion Brown had seen at the northeast edge of the property.
(Plaintiffs' Brief at 29.) That erosion, however, was some 20
feet away from the freezer that Mr. Penton linked to the soil
slippage.

(R. 303.) Moreover, Robert Russo described the

erosion as a "small spot" that was a "minor, very minor,
problem."

(R. 319, 326.) That description, of course, is

wholly inconsistent with a problem serious enough for an
engineer to look at and for Penton to make a special call to
Brown to disclose it.
Bridlewoodfs president, Clinton Frank, had visited the
property in July, 1983, but did not return to Utah untij. well
after the closing of the transaction.

(R. 179.) The slippage

line in the asphalt had been visible to Mr. Frank when he
visited the property in July.

(R. 167-8.) Even after Mr.

Penton acquired the listing in January, 1984, Mr. Frank assumed
that the condition would be visible to anyone who visited the
property,

(R. 182.) Mr. Frank testified that he did not

intend to conceal the condition of the property from anyone.
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(R. 177, 190.)

Indeed, it was Mr. Frank who had decided not to

repave the area of the asphalt crack when that was considered
as a solution to the asphalt slippage months before the
plaintiffs' purchase of the property.

(R. 228-9.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Judge Roth correctly held that Bridlewood did not
conceal any facts about the property*

Bridlewoodfs real estate

agent disclosed to the plaintiffs1 agent everything Bridlewood
knew about the property.

The plaintiffs testified that they

would have been concerned and would have investigated if they
had known those facts.

The plaintiffs1 agent, however, failed

to reveal to the plaintiffs any of the facts he had learned
from Bridlewoodfs agent.

Bridlewood cannot be held responsible

for the concealment by the plaintiffs1 own agent.
The plaintiffs1 effort to impose liability on
Bridlewood on the basis of a failure to investigate the soil
slippage on the property is misplaced for two reasons.

First,

the claim is hot supported by the facts. When Bridlewood's
real estate agents became aware of slippage on the property,
they examined the property, hired an engineer with expertise in
soils problems, and obtained the engineer's opinion about the
condition of the property.

All of this information was

disclosed to the plaintiffs' agent.
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Second, the duty of investigation that the plaintiffs
attempt to impose on Bridlewood is a duty that is unique to
listing brokers of residential real estate. The duty has never
been imposed on a seller of real property, and it has never
been applied to the sale of commercial real estate.
Bridlewood's only duty was to disclose what it had learned
about the property, and it discharged that duty.
ARGUMENT
Although the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint
claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation and for
fraudulent concealment, they take issue on this appeal only
with the trial court's holding that there was no fraudulent
concealment.

The plaintiffs have also argued the theory that

Bridlewood9s listing agent failed to investigate the nature of
the soil slippage on the property.

The plaintiffs accept Judge

Roth's findings of fact and challenge only his conclusions of
law.

As is discussed more fully below, Judge Roth's ruling was

correct on all of the issues.
I.

JUDGE ROTH CORRECTLY HELD THAT BRIDLEWOOD'S DUTY OF
DISCLOSURE WAS DISCHARGED WHEN ITS REAL ESTATE AGENT
DISCLOSED TO THE PLAINTIFFS' REAL ESTATE AGENT THE FACTS
ABOUT THE SOIL SLIPPAGE ON THE RESTAURANT PROPERTY.
The facts adduced at trial can support no conclusion

other than that Bridlewood's agent discharged Bridlewood's
obligation of disclosure. As the plaintiffs point out in their
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brief, the negotiations and closing of the transaction were
conducted solely through the parties1 real estate agents. The
plaintiffs had never spoken with Clinton Frank or any other
Bridlewood representative before this case was filed.
Therefore, the focus of this case is on the knowledge of the
parties1 agents and their discussions.
Rick Wadman, Bridlewood's first real estate agent, was
the source of Bridlewood's knowledge about the soil slippage.
Mr. Wadman investigated the slippage by hiring an engineer,
George Adamson, who examined the property.

Mr. Adamson told

Mr. Wadman that although the slippage appeared to have
stablized as of the time of his examination (July, 1983), it
could slip further if additional heavy rain saturation
occurred.

This was the very information that Mr. Wadman passed

on to Bob Penton, Bridlewood?s second real estate agent.
Mr. Penton immediately examined the property himself
and passed on the information he had received to the
plaintiffs1 agent, Steve Brown.

It was at that point that the

only breakdown in communication occurred in this case. Mr.
Brown decided not to do anything with the knowledge he had
received from Mr. Penton.

He didn't visit the property.

He

didn't tell his clients about the slippage. He didn't tell
them about the engineer's examination and conclusions. Mr.
Brown didn't tell the plaintiffs anything about his
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conversation with Mr. Penton.

The plaintiffs testified that

they would have investigated further if they had been told
about the slippage and the engineer's examination.
In order to prove a case of fraudulent concealment,
the plaintiffs must prove that the defendant knowingly or
recklessly concealed a latent condition of the property; that
the latent condition existed at the time of the sale and would
have been material to the plaintiffs' decision to purchase; and
that the defendant concealed the condition for the purpose of
inducing the plaintiffs to buy the property.

Sugarhouse

Finance Co. v Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980).

The

plaintiffs must prove each of these elements of fraud by f,clear
and convincing" evidence.

Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951,

954 (Utah 1978); Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 143, 247 P.2d
273, 274 (1952).
The plaintiffs in this case not only failed to prove
that Bridlewood had any intent to conceal anything from them,
but they failed to establish the very foundation of the claim:
a concealment by Bridlewood.

The only concealment in this case

was Steve Brown's failure to tell his clients what he had
learned from Bridlewood1s agent.

The plaintiffs' argument that

Bridlewood should have foreseen Brown's concealment is both
ludicrous and inconsistent with their concession that they are
bound by their agent's acts and omissions.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Judge Roth correctly held that Steve Brown's knowledge
was chargeable to the plaintiffs, and that once Brown was made
aware of the soil slippage and the engineer's examination and
opinion, he should have told the plaintiffs what he knew.

The

plaintiffs and their agent were then obligated to conduct such
further investigation as might have been necessary to inform
themselves of the nature of the slippage.
Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah 1978).

Cheever v.

"'Knowledge which is

sufficient to lead a prudent person to inquire about the matter
when it could have been ascertained conveniently, constitutes
notice of whatever the inquiry would have disclosed, and will
be regarded as knowledge of the facts. fff

Peterson v. Koch

Industries, Inc., 684 F.2d 667, 671 (10th Cir. 1982) (citation
omitted).
Judge Roth's conclusions of law are consistent with
precedent from this Court.

For example, in Cole v. Parker, 5

Utah 2d 263, 300 P.2d 623 (1956), this Court upheld the trial
court's denial of the plaintiff's claim for rescission of a
real estate purchase contract.

The plaintiff had claimed that

the defendant failed to disclose certain facts about the water
supply to the agricultural property in question.

Before the

plaintiff had purchased the property, the defendant-vendor had
shown the plaintiff around the property and had taken the
plaintiff to see the source of the creek that supplied water to
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the property.

The defendant also told the plaintiff that the

creek could deliver more water to the property if it were lined
along a portion of its course.
After taking possession of the property, the plaintiff
discovered that there was a fault along the course of the creek
into which much of the water supply was lost, resulting in what
the plaintiff deemed an insufficient water supply to the land.
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had taken him on a
roundabout tour of the land for the purpose of concealing the
existence of the fault; that the existence of the fault was not
reasonably discoverable; and that the defendant's failure to
disclose it constituted a fraudulent concealment.
This Court upheld the trial court's judgment for the
defendant on the ground that the defendant had made adequate
disclosure of the condition of the water supply to the property.
While we agree with plaintiffs9 cited authorities
that a material nondisclosure or a half-truth may
be the basis for an action on fraud as well as a
positive representation, . . . we do not agree
that because the seller did not discuss with
particularity the cause of the loss of water, the
buyer is at liberty to rescind his contract. . . .
"It was [the buyers1] duty to make such
investigation and inquiry as reasonable care under
the circumstances would dictate . . . ."
5 Utah 2d at 266, 300 P.2d at 625 (citing Lewis v. White, 2
Utah 2d 101, 269 P.2d 865 (1954)).
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In the present case, the plaintiffs acquired
constructive knowledge, through their agent, that the property
they were about to buy had experienced soil slippage and that
the seller had retained an engineer to examine the slippage
condition.

At that point the duty of investigation and

disclosure shifted to the plaintiffs' agent.

The parties agree

that Steve Brown breached that duty.. The plaintiffs chose not
to sue Mr. Brown, their longtime acquaintance, but that
omission does not change the fact that the only failure to
investigate and disclose was his. Judge Roth correctly held
that Bridlewood is not responsible for Brown's failure to
disclose the slippage condition to the plaintiffs, or for the
plaintiffs' consequent failure to investigate and inform
themselves about the condition.
II.

BRIDLEWOOD DISCHARGED WHATEVER DUTY IT HAD TO INVESTIGATE
THE FACTS ABOUT THE SOIL SLIPPAGE ON THE RESTAURANT
PROPERTY.
As is discussed more fully below, the duty of

investigation that the plaintiffs seek to impose on Bridlewood
is a duty that the plaintiffs concede has been accepted in only
two states.

Even in those states, the duty is unique to real

estate brokers.

The theory is misapplied to Bridlewood, the

seller of the property in the present case.

The simplest

response to the claim, however, is that Bridlewood and its
agents conducted a sufficient investigation to have discharged
such an obligation even if it existed.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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When Bridlewoodfs first agent, Rick Wadman, saw
evidence of soil slippage on the property, he didn't stand pat
with that knowledge; he retained George Adamson, an engineer
who had been recommended to Mr. Wadman because of his
experience and knowledge of soils problems in the vicinity of
the restaurant property.

Mr. Adamson examined the property and

told Mr. Wadman that it was difficult to predict what would
happen in the future, but that the property could remain stable
for the next 50 to 100 years.
When Mr. Wadman conveyed this same information to Bob
Penton, Bridlewood's next listing agent, Mr. Penton also
investigated the situation.

Mr. Penton immediately visited the

property and examined the area of worst slippage that Mr.
Wadman had described, under the freezer at the back of the
building.

Mr. Penton saw the very slippage that Mr. Wadman had

described to him.

Mr. Penton immediately called the

plaintiffs1 agent, Mr. Brown, and conveyed to Brown the
*- •- -

contents of his conversation with Mr. Wadman and related what
he had seen when he visited the property.

It was at this point

that any investigation or disclosure ceased.

Mr. Brown neither

investigated the problem nor disclosed it to his clients.
Thus, to the extent that a duty of investigation could be
applied to a seller of commercial real estate, Bridlewood and
its agents discharged that obligation.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The plaintiffs' argument is more fundamentally flawed,
however, because it is misapplied to the defendant in this
case.

The California case on which the plaintiffs rely so

heavily, Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199
Cal. Rptr. 383, 391 (1984), holds that a listing broker of
residential real estate owes a duty to prospective purchasers
of the property to exercise reasonable care to disclose any
facts materially affecting the value of the property that the
broker could discover through the exercise of reasonable
diligence.

The theory of that case does not apply to

Bridlewood for two reasons.
First, and most obviously, the duty that the
California appellate court imposed was unique to the listing
broker, and was not applied to the seller of the property.
Neither the Easton case nor any other case cited by the
plaintiffs has extended the duty beyond the broker to the
seller of the property.

Indeed, this Court has cited Easton

as one of the "cases from California which focus on the status
and responsibilities of real estate brokers . . . ."
Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 795 n.l (Utah 1986) (emphasis
added).
The reason the duty of investigation is limited to
brokers is apparent from the California court's reasoning in
Easton*

The court reasoned that real estate brokers are often
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in a very commanding position with respect to prospective
buyers of residential property; buyers usually have a relative
lack of knowledge and experience in real estate transactions
and therefore expect the broker to protect their interests.
199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. As a result, the court concluded that
the relationship between a real estate broker and a prospective
buyer is one of trust and confidence that requires extra
vigilance by the broker on the buyer's behalf.

Id.

The court

also relied on the fact that realtors are subject to a written
code of ethics that requires them "to discover adverse factors
that a reasonably competent and diligent investigation would
disclose."

199 Cal. Rptr. at 389.

The seller of the property, by contrast, owes no
fiduciary duty to the buyer, Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263,
268, 300 P.2d 623, 626 (1956); and has no professional
obligation to investigate on the buyer's behalf.

The court in

Easton imposed the duty of investigation only on the broker,
and specifically distinguished cases in which sellers of
property had been held liable for fraudulent misrepresentation
or concealment.

199 Cal. Rptr. at 390-1. This Court has also

distinguished the limited duty of disclosure imposed on the
seller of real estate from the broader duty of care that a real
. estate agent owes to prospective purchasers.

Dugan v. Jones«

615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980).
The second reason why the Easton theory is misapplied
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to Bridlewood is that the Easton court itself limited its
holding to transactions involving residential real estate:
We express no opinion here whether a broker's
obligation to conduct: an inspection for defects for
the benefit of the buyer applies to the sale of
commercial real estate. Unlike the residential
home buyer who is often unrepresented by a broker,
or who is effectively unrepresented because of the
problems of dual agency [citations omitted], a
purchaser of commercial real estate is likely to
be more experienced and sophisticated in his
dealings in real estate and is usually represented
by an agent who represents only the buyer's
interest. [citation omitted.]
199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 n.8 (emphasis added).
The court's reasoning applies squarely to the present
case.

The plaintiffs were purchasing commercial real estate

for the purpose of operating a restaurant business on it.

The

plaintiffs were experienced businessmen who had bought and sold
real property before.

Most importantly, the plaintiffs1

interests were being protected - - or were supposed to have
been protected - - by their own real estate agent, who was
advising them about price, terms, the property, and even about
the restaurant business its^Lf. Jttius, even if this Court were
to adopt the California appellate court's expansion of
negligence liability for brokers, that theory wouldn't apply
even to Bridlewoodfs listing agent in this case.

The theory

certainly doesnft apply to Bridlewood.
Finally, even if the Easton theory could be applied
to Bridlewood's listing agent in this case, and even if
Bridlewood's listing agent hadn't discharged his obligation of
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investigation, Bridlewood could not be held responsible for its
agent's failure to discharge a duty that is unique to the
agent.

While it is true that a principal may be responsible

for its agent's acts or omissions, those acts or omissions must
be within the scope of the agent's authority.

Under the

holding of the Easton case, however, the duty of investigation
was imposed only on the broker, and not on the seller of the
property.

If a listing broker failed to make a reasonable

investigation under that theory, he would be breaching his own
duty and not any duty that he was performing on behalf of the
seller.

The plaintiffs cannot bootstrap the alleged failure of

Bridlewoodfs agent to discharge his own duty into a claim of
negligence against Bridlewood itself.
CONCLUSION
Bridlewood discharged whatever obligation it had to
investigate the soil slippage on the property and to disclose
it to the plaintiffs.

The only breakdown in investigation and

disclosure was between the plaintiffs and their own agent.

For

these reasons, Bridlewood respectfully requests that the Court
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
DATED this «ffi^day of ^2Li^OL^t

1987.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Defendant
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